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ABSTRACT 
       This paper presents the findings of part of a 30 month investigation, conducted to 
better understand the persistent failure of management practitioners to fund potentially 
disruptive innovations.  A Mode 2 case study strategy was employed.  The iterative 
transfer of knowledge, between four industrial cases and academia, has successfully 
culminated in new academic understanding of disruptive innovation and guidance for 
practitioners.  It was found that funding decisions are mainly constrained by mental not 
physical processes.  Organisations wishing to pursue disruptive innovations can 
challenge psychological attachments to incrementalism, and overcome the funding 
barrier, with a holistic understanding delivered through graphical portfolio tools. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
       Organisational innovation effort is traditionally focused upon performance 
improvement in attributes most valued by the most demanding customers - those 
willing to pay higher prices.  Thus, both incremental and radical innovations offer 
performance improvements that lead-customers [1] desire and expect [2, 3, 4]; 
however, occasionally revolutionary breakthroughs occur with a discontinuous impact 
upon this steady state [4, 5, 6]. 
       Conventionally, discontinuous innovations offer revolutionary leaps forward in 
performance improvement, in directions that lead-customers desire, yet break the 
steady-state as they are not yet expected to be possible [4, 7].  However, there is a type 
of lesser understood discontinuity, known as disruptive innovation.  Disruptive 
innovations are characterised by processes, products, services or business models that 
offer lower performance along traditional trajectories.  As such, they are under-valued 
by traditional lead customers and often generate lower gross margins.  Perceived as 
“low-end” by industry incumbents, disruptive innovations introduce new types of 
performance criteria to niche markets. Through a period of exploitation and migration 
upstream towards higher-end customers, they eventually redefine the paradigms and 
value propositions on which existing industries are based [4, 7, 8, 9].  For example, 
Ryanair and easyJet have pioneered the low-cost-no-frills airline industry in Europe 
and, by migrating into the frequent flyer markets, nearly all European air travel carriers 
are now trying to adopt the low cost model [10]. Christensen [4] and Gilbert [11] were 
the first to propose that there are two ways of delivering disruptive innovation - “low-
end” and “new-market” disruptive strategies.  Both gain their energy from the fact that 
organisations get trapped into oversupplying their customers’ needs. ‘Performance 
oversupply’ creates a vacuum into which disruptive innovations can flourish by 
providing simpler propositions [12]. 
       Christensen’s [4, 12] low-end disruption thesis (Figure 1), states that performance 
oversupply leaves organisations vulnerable to new, simpler propositions entering the 
industry from below.  A process of sustaining innovation, from the low-end niche 
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market, allows the disruptive innovation to migrate upstream, eventually disrupting 
and transforming the traditional industry.  Examples include: 
• Cannon’s introduction of simple table and desk-top photocopiers into small and 
medium sized enterprises, which eventually disrupted Xerox’s control of the high-
speed photocopying industry. 
• Seagate’s 5.25 inch disk drives used to launch the Personal Computer, which 
disrupted the more complex and more expensive 8 inch drives, produced for use in 
mini-computers by the likes of Shugart and Quantum. 
Figure 1.  Revolutionary innovation as a disruption from below [12]. 
 
       Gilbert’s [11, 13] thesis of a new-market disruptive strategy (Figure 2), states that 
industries can create or target emerging markets of ‘non-consumers’ - customers who 
have historically lacked the skill or money to buy and use their products.  It is from 
this position, with incremental improvements, that they can build new net growth with 
more non-consumers and eventually enter and transform existing markets using the 
low-end approach.  Examples include: 
• eBay’s introduction of a facility whereby items, not sellable in traditional auction 
houses, could now be sold in a similar “to the highest bidder” fashion. 
• Henry Ford’s introduction of comparatively inexpensive cars to non-auto consumers, 
transformed the traditional industry of expensive, customised car manufacturing. 
 Figure 2.  New-market disruption [11]. 
 
       Foster and Kaplan [15] conducted an analysis of the Standard & Poor’s index of 
90 important US companies.  An organisation joining the index in the 1930s, could 
expect to remain listed for 65 years, this had dropped to just 10 years for companies 
joining in 1998.  Clearly, today’s organisations face increasingly discontinuous 
business environments and it is well-recognised that firms need to periodically engage 
in the process of revolutionary innovation for long-term survival [15, 16, 4, 17, 18, 6, 
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19, 20].  However, while many companies achieve successful sustaining innovation, 
few organisations have established track records for undertaking successful 
revolutionary or disruptive change [4, 21, 18].  For example, an article in 
businesswire.com [14] illustrates that one-third of the companies listed in the 1970 
Fortune 500, had vanished by 1983 and attributed almost all of this demise to 
companies not anticipating and/or embracing ‘disruptive innovations’.  The perils of 
continuity are stronger that ever [15, 18].  Thus a vital question in the strategic 
management of an organisation is: How can the business of today successfully 
innovate - to generate, develop and exploit ideas - in order to deliver revolutionary 
new wealth creation and long term survival for tomorrow?  The answer, it would 
appear, could be found in a better understanding of disruptive innovation. 
       The authors are involved in leading a 30 month research project tasked with 
investigating disruptive innovation and practitioners’ continual mismanagement of the 
phenomenon.  The first stage of the research project identified four top barriers to 
disruptive innovation: (1) the strategic importance of disruptive innovation is not 
understood; (2) there exists an inability to recognise or generate disruptive concepts; 
(3) there are inappropriate funding routines, which fail to initiate or support potentially 
disruptive projects; (4) traditional new product/service development routines strangle 
all but continuous innovation.  The aim of this paper is to present the findings of the 
preceding 12 month focused investigation into the funding barrier, in an attempt to 
deepen academic understanding and help practitioners to overcome this obstacle. 
Inappropriate Funding Routines 
       Unlike other barriers to disruptive innovation discussed in the literature (e.g. an 
inability to ‘think-out-of-the- box’ to generate non-linear ideas [22, 23] etc), there 
exists little, if any evidence that reports upon proposed solutions or authors attempts to 
overcome the barrier of inappropriate funding routines.  Advice is available to 
practitioners and academics alike on how to manage potentially disruptive projects and 
how to launch and manage potentially disruptive concepts in the market place.  
However, as the director of R&D in one of the authors’ industrial collaborators stated 
“… this knowledge on disruptive innovations will ‘fall on deaf ears’ if there’s no 
money for such initiatives in the first place”.  If the funding barrier to disruptive 
innovation could be better understood, then perhaps management practitioners’ ability 
to select, initiate and capitalise on funding potentially disruptive projects could be 
enhanced, generating options for longer term organisational survival. 
       A theory called ‘resource dependence’ [24] can be used to illustrate how funding 
routines are created, which prevent practitioners from benefiting from knowledge on 
disruptive innovation.  The theory posits that a company’s freedom of action is limited. 
Practitioners must ensure that they satisfy the needs of those entities outside the firm 
that give it the resources it needs to survive - primarily its customers and investors [4].  
When existing customers do not want disruptive propositions, because of appearances 
of lower level performance, practitioners ignore the new concepts and become focused 
upon satisfying their customers as a key resource stream.  When investors want to see 
immediate and significant returns on investment, small markets do not appear to be 
attractive solutions to the growth needs of companies.  Once again resource 
dependence moves senior managements’ attention away from disruptive innovation. 
       Inappropriate funding routines can also be explained by ‘path dependence’ [25], a 
similar phenomenon to ‘resource dependence’.  Many organisations remain focused 
upon historically dependent technology, product, or customer related paths, which 
support and enhance continuous innovation.  Decision choices, framed within the 
context of an organisation’s history, are less likely to be met with resistance than those 
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which migrate from the traditional path [26].  Such dependence upon a history or past 
has been found to place limits on companies’ problem solving abilities [27, 28]. 
Therefore, path dependencies have a negative effect in terms of defining new futures, 
where core competencies become core rigidities [27, 28].  Tripsas and Gravetti [29] 
investigated the case of Polaroid and concluded that its failure to adopt disruptive 
digital technologies was mainly determined by the cognitive inertia, or the path 
dependence, of its corporate executives’ decision making.  Polaroid went into Chapter 
11 bankruptcy in October 2001 because of its ties to its history.  Its path dependence 
restricted the funding and initiation of appropriate projects and left the organisation 
open to the destructive forces of disruptive innovation. 
       The current body of knowledge on disruptive innovation provides numerous 
reasons for practitioners’ mismanagement of the phenomenon and inappropriate 
resource allocation is one of these top inhibitors.  The theories of resource and path 
dependence can be used to describe and better explain the existence of inappropriate 
funding routines, thus generating insights into the difficulties of funding potentially 
disruptive projects.  However, despite growing understanding on the topic of 
disruptive innovation, academia has thus far failed to give a comprehensive description 
and analysis as to why these barriers and the resultant mismanagement occur in the 
first place.  The literature fails to explain why managers build routines that consistently 
fall into the traps of resource and path dependence.  Thus the funding barrier to 
disruptive innovation is described and acknowledged, but little has been done to 
explain why it occurs or to better understand it with a view to helping practitioners 
overcome this obstacle. 
METHODOLOGY 
       To ensure that academically robust management research, into topics such as 
disruptive innovation, is relevant and reliable, it must be closely mapped to the needs 
and experiences of industrialists [30].  Authors, such as Stewart et al [31] state that 
there is a complex, challenging and sometimes problematic relationship between 
management practice and the practice of management research.  There are difficulties 
in satisfying a dual academic-industrial audience.  The challenge is further enhanced 
by the entrenched perception that a push for industrial relevance in management 
research has negative consequences for academic rigour and vice versa [32, 33].  The 
pursuit of rigour and relevance has generated increased support for investigative 
strategies such as 'action research' [34].  Similarly the concept of ‘Mode 2’ research 
has been elevated to the fore of management inquiry by academics such as Hill et al 
[33] and Huff [35], along with others from institutions such as the British Academy of 
Management [36].  Action research and the Mode 2 approach can offer researchers an 
opportunity to simultaneously seek relevance without sacrificing rigour.  Thus, the 
current research takes advantage of a collaborative academic-industrial approach 
inspired by the ‘Mode 2’ and ‘action research’ strategies.  The investigation was 
founded upon four features that typify the Mode 2 approach to research [31]: (1) The 
research problem, ‘How can organisations understand and foster disruptive 
innovation?’, was framed in the context of application; (2) A heterogeneous group of 
both academics and practitioners were engaged in the investigation using a trans-
disciplinary approach; (3) The group had a socially-distributed research capability; (4) 
Theory-building and application were combined in the co-production of new 
knowledge.  The 30 month investigation has employed Yin’s [27] and Eisenhardt’s 
[38] approaches to the use of case studies for building theory (four cases were 
appropriately selected and used), along with an extensive and on-going literature 
survey and on-going expert interviews.  The multi-method research strategy has been 
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employed to triangulate findings and to co-create understanding with industry on how 
organisations can foster disruptive innovation. 
       Two of the four cases will be used to illustrate the findings presented in this paper 
from the preceding 12 months of the investigation.  The first case reported in this paper 
is a small-medium sized plastics mouldings manufacturer based in France (case A), 
and the second is the principal division of a large manufacturing company based in 
Israel (case B).  Multiple qualitative data collection techniques have been used within 
the cases over the 12 month period; they were conducted over four phases (see table 
1): 10 interviews, 6 two to three day workshops and monthly informal email and 
telephone conversations.  The data have been analysed using methods recommended 
by Eisenhardt [38] and Miles and Huberman [39].  The data collection methods 
generate two primary units of analysis [40] ‘management actions taken’ and 
‘individual managerial cognition’ and two secondary units of analysis ‘the internal 
organisational context’ and the ‘external organisational context’  The intended output 
of the research plan was an in-depth understanding of resource allocation routines, 
including efforts to finance non-linear initiatives; and the delivery of insights into how 
practitioners can overcome the aforementioned funding barriers. 
PHASE DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUE OBJECTIVES 
- 4 x interviews (one with each of the four cases). 
Email discussions. 
To build agreement of research process and initial 
understanding of funding barriers within each case. 
- 1 x three-day multi-organisational workshop (4  cases, 15 
participants). 
To better understand funding barrier and to generate a 
view from practitioners of feasible solutions. 
Phase 1:  
Building 
groundwork 
understanding 
- 2 x semi-structured telephone interviews with cases A and B. To conduct in-depth follow-up analysis. 
- 2 x semi-structured telephone interviews with cases A and B 
PLUS informal email and telephone conversations. 
To gather in-depth data and present initial findings in 
order to iteratively home in on roots of problems. 
- CASE A: 1 x Two-day workshop with senior management 
team (5 participants), including tour of site. 
To deliver more detailed understanding of funding 
barrier and individual requirements of solution types. 
Phase 2:  
Building 
deeper 
understanding 
- CASE B: 2 x Telephone conferences with senior managers 
and engineers (4 participants in total). 
To deliver more detailed understanding of funding 
barrier and individual requirements of solution types. 
- CASE A: 1 x Two-day workshop with senior management 
team (5 participants). 
To conduct a two-day implementation of the resource 
allocation intervention. 
Phase 3:  
Implementing 
intervention - CASE B: 1 x One-day workshop with senior management 
team and senior engineers (16 participants). 
To conduct a one-day implementation of the resource 
allocation intervention. 
Phase 4:  
Building 
management 
implications 
- 2 x semi-structured telephone interviews with cases A and B. 
- 2 x presentations on the intervention from senior practitioners 
of cases A and B to wider research group. 
To conduct in-depth follow-up analysis and to ensure 
no researcher bias of the evaluation of researcher led 
interventions. 
Table 1. A research plan to investigate inappropriate finding routines. 
DELIVERING A DEEPER UNDERSTANDING OF FUNDING ROUTINES 
       Data analysed from the “phase 1” three-day cross-functional workshop involving 
all four cases, interviews and email discussions, showed clear evidence of a 
disconnection between potentially disruptive innovations and resource allocation.  
Senior management from each of the industrial collaborators revealed inadequacies in 
their current mechanisms.  A significant need for management support was exposed, 
along with the need for tools to help with allocating resources to disruptive innovation.  
Furthermore, in seeking to better understand the nature and impact of inappropriate 
funding routines, initial characteristics transpired for an ideal solution to the funding 
barrier.  Five top themes emerged from the data analysis: 
1. Senior management need help to “see the whole innovation playing field – not 
just incrementalism”, thus facilitating the identification and support of 
potentially disruptive opportunities. 
2. Senior management need help to “legitimise the allocation of resources” to 
potentially disruptive opportunities. 
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3. Senior management want “best practice funding guidance” and want help with 
communicating this to the business, i.e. how to provide and protect resources to 
support the development of niche market offerings and how to create return on 
investment commitments that allow practitioners to be patient for growth but 
ensure their impatience for profitability. 
4. Senior management want to prevent projects with a dominant history or 
dominant people from soaking resources away from disruptive opportunities. 
5. Senior management want help to achieve the above objectives whilst delivering 
best practice innovation management at all points in the new product, service, 
and process development cycle. (e.g. maximising benefits from investment into 
innovation, preventing project gridlock, delivery of strategic aims and a 
balanced focus between sustaining and potentially disruptive projects). 
       A further outcome of phase 1, not to be underestimated, was an increase in trust 
within the research group, this enabled the open sharing and cross case examination of 
many personal experiences in the pursuit of innovation. 
Inappropriate Funding Routines: A problem of the mind not one of process 
       The existence of open communication and trust, between the academic and 
industrial parties, became the key facilitator of the deeper investigation into the 
funding barriers of the two cases.  Early in phase 2 of the investigation, the authors 
discovered that the funding barrier seemed not to be grounded in managements’ ill 
equipped resource allocation processes, nor was it based upon a lack of intended 
strategic commitment.  It was found that budgeting committees, production and 
marketing executives were reporting that that were simply “not comfortable” with 
allocating resources to concepts that were not valued by traditional lead-customers.  
This was especially true for concepts that also lowered performance along traditional 
trajectories, whilst potentially offering lower gross margins.  The data unequivocally 
demonstrated that the problem’s roots were in the practitioner's cognitive processes.   
       It was decided to use the observation of a cognitive root to the funding barrier as a 
tool to illicit deeper insights within the latter stage of phase 2 data collection.  The 
researchers described and presented to the practitioners a common problem that was 
occurring across the cases.  When presented with potentially disruptive opportunities, 
management in both cases A and B reported that they recognised and even felt the 
existence of inconsistencies between their current understanding of their organisation 
and the new opportunities.  The inconsistencies between conflicting perceptions of 
current business and opportunities with disruptive potential, led to feelings of 
uneasiness and even resentment.  The existence of such conflict creates a cognitive 
driver to employ strategies to reduce the dissonant feelings.  The strategies ultimately 
resulted in the rejection of the potentially disruptive opportunities in order to alleviate 
the practitioners reported uneasiness. 
       The discussion with practitioners in both cases about the “anti-disruptive cognitive 
process” facilitated a deeper analysis of past and present situations in which potentially 
disruptive opportunities were present.  The analysis of phase 2 data revealed 
practitioners’ employment of numerous cognitive strategies, all used to reduce the 
feeling of uneasiness that accompanies potentially disruptive innovations.  
Furthermore, the use of these strategies could be linked to one root cause, the existence 
of restrictive ‘mental models’. 
Mental Models: A root cause for the employment of disruptive innovation rejection 
strategies 
Paper presented at: The 11TH International Product Development Management Conference 
Design to Deliver: The Challenge of International Integration. Dublin, Ireland, JUNE 20-22 
1187 
       It was observed that the top management teams in both cases appeared to possess 
shared, deeply ingrained, assumptions and generalisations and even images of their 
organisations.  These images both influenced how management understood the world 
and how they took action.  Management awareness of these shared images was 
virtually non-existent and an understanding of their impact was almost entirely 
missing.  Thus, despite espousing support for radical innovation, the management 
teams within both cases possessed images of their organisations that only really 
supported a “more of the same” approach.   
       Argyris [41] notes that people do not always behave congruently with their 
espoused theories, they do however behave congruently with their “theories-in-use”, or 
what Senge [42] calls mental models.  The shared mental model of the management 
team within each case appeared to be built upon common elements of each 
individual’s mental model, but also guided by the dominant top executives’ 
perspectives.  This shared view significantly affected the support that was given to the 
initiation of projects and how senior management perceived the impact of potentially 
disruptive innovations.  Mental models have hugely powerful effects upon what we do 
because they affect what we see [42].  For example, in case A, top management were 
firmly attached to a clear vision of their business.  The team’s vision was so loyal to its 
key product range that their plastic mouldings technologies and competencies, 
although applicable to other sectors, remained focused in one particular market.  This 
shared mental model prevented support for the application of knowledge to unfamiliar 
markets and even blinkered them from the disruptive potential of competitors.  Senge 
[42] states “…that many of the best ideas never get put into practice… because they 
conflict with deeply held internal images of how the world works, [mental models are] 
images that limit us to familiar ways of thinking and acting.” (p 174) 
       Using the term ‘mental model’ enables a better understanding of management 
practitioners’ perception of inconsistencies between funding options.  It explains why 
the management teams, in both cases A and B, were led to the employment of rejection 
strategies.  Senge [42] observes that if a person anticipates dissonance between an 
opportunity and their established mental model, then he or she should be expected to 
react to minimise or completely avoid the perceived probable discomfort.  Thus, 
feelings of uneasiness that accompany disruptive innovations are aroused because of a 
cognitive dissonance in the prevailing mental model.  Mental models create skewed 
perceptions, which deliver a failure to see the disruptive potential in new concepts.  
New values are attached to potentially disruptive ideas, which differ from the actual 
values of those concepts.  The result is the rejection of ideas incongruent with mental 
models in an attempt to alleviate the presence of unwanted conflicting emotion. 
       The authors concluded from the phase 2 data collection that to overcome the 
barrier of inappropriate funding routines, the implementation of new financing 
processes and strategies alone will not work.  Senior management need tools or 
interventions to help them to understand how their current mental models determine a 
fixed and narrow view of innovation as incrementalism.  Managers need to be able to 
see how their current actions (which are driven by their cognitions) lead to the 
disregarding or mismanagement of potentially disruptive innovations.  In fact, Senge 
[42] predicts that a major breakthrough in the practice of organisational management 
in the future will be “… the discipline of managing mental models – surfacing, testing 
and improving our internal picture of how the world works” (p170). 
Designing an Intervention: Illustrating mental model impact with graphical tools 
       Observations of the restrictive impact of senior managers shared mental models, 
motivated the development of an intervention in the form of a group process directed 
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toward senior practitioners.  The data showed if practitioners could see how and why 
they inhibit the allocation of funding to disruptive innovations, then they will be in a 
more self aware position to tackle the barrier.  Thus the intervention needed to expose 
and explain the prevailing mental models that were at the root of the funding barrier.  
For the senior management teams to fund disruptive innovation, they needed to be able 
to see differently.  As it is claimed by seeing wholes we learn to foster health [42], it 
was decided that a ‘visual tool’, which can deliver ‘holistic understanding’, should 
form a large component of an intervention to the funding problem.   
       Portfolio Management (PM) is a recognised and trusted graphically based 
management tool, utilised by senior management teams within many of the world’s 
most innovative organisations [43, 44].  Using graphical and visual techniques to 
deliver a holistic understanding of innovation activity, PM improves resource 
allocation decisions [43, 44].  However, there are very few references to the pursuit of 
disruptive innovation in the publications of the leading edge PM thinkers.  
Furthermore, PM methods, in their current form, have not been developed to 
encourage the funding of potentially disruptive initiatives [45].  Despite claims to the 
contrary, nearly two-thirds of approximately 300 organisations, participating in a 
recent on-line conference on disruptive innovation, stated they believed that portfolio 
approaches are the best way to deal with the unpredictability of innovation that moves 
beyond the steady state [45].   
       These findings led the authors to develop an intervention called the “Disruptive 
Portfolio Management (DPM)” tool.  Like other portfolio approaches, the DPM was 
designed to provide a holistic understanding of innovation activity for improved 
funding decisions.  However, unlike other portfolio approaches, the DPM integrates a 
state of the art understanding of disruptive innovation.  It was designed to enable 
participants to understand why disruptive opportunities had not been easily financed in 
the past, and to help justify investment into potentially disruptive projects in the future. 
Overview of the Disruptive Portfolio Management Tool: 
       A process overview for the implementation of the DPM methodology was 
designed and agreed upon with the industrial collaborators.  Financial measures were 
traditionally favoured by the management practitioners in both cases for assessing 
innovation initiatives.  However, a concentration upon financial measures delivers the 
worst performing portfolios [44].  Therefore, the authors designed and prepared an 
innovation project assessment process, founded upon series of questionnaires called 
the dimensions ranking checklists (DRCs).  The DRCs have two objectives: (1) To 
assess individual innovation initiatives on a range of standard PM measures, plus a 
cluster of qualitative and quantitative measures focused upon disruptive innovation, in 
order to gauge the impact of the initiatives under consideration (e.g. incremental, 
radical, discontinuous or potentially disruptive); (2) To assess individual innovation 
initiatives at varying stages of maturity, from early stage idea to advanced innovation 
project.  The assessments can be completed as ‘homework’ by the relevant project 
managers or R&D team.  Each case selected at least 10 high priority innovation 
projects, and a small selection of recently killed initiatives for assessment with the 
DRCs.  The output of this assessment was designed to be mapped onto seven large 
scale portfolio maps or “Bubble Diagrams” (where projects are plotted on 1m2 X-Y 
axes on a variety of parameters).  Four of the maps were standard portfolio 
management views and three were designed to specifically account for disruptive 
innovation.  The aim was to present to each of the senior management teams a holistic 
graphical representation of their portfolio’s of priority innovation projects.  The lead 
author then designed a one to two day DPM workshop that would introduce the 
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concept of disruptive innovation (to the full senior management team responsible for 
innovation strategy and resource allocation) and facilitate the participants through an 
analysis of the data from their portfolio maps. 
A RESOURCE ALLOCATION INTERVENTION: THE FINDINGS  
Evaluating the Intervention 
       The senior management team of case A, consisting of five members, took part in a 
two-day DPM workshop in France and a one day workshop was conducted in Israel 
with the R&D director and 15 senior members of case B.  The methodology has 
allowed both cases to see emerging patterns in their approach to innovation.  For 
example, there was recognition that they overly focused on technology and not the 
markets; they attempt to skip the niche marketing approach needed to enable 
disruption and they succumb to the pressure to seek high revenue mainstream markets.  
The management teams in both cases reported that they now have, for the first time, a 
holistic understanding of the entire innovation playing field.  Immediately following 
the intervention, the teams stated that they felt convinced about the importance of 
disruptive strategies and could legitimise the allocation of resources to the pursuit of 
disruptive innovation.  Furthermore, this positive feedback was reiterated two months 
after each intervention, both in follow-up interviews and in presentations made by the 
practitioners to a wider research group on the impact of the DPM tool.  The 
methodology forced critical discussion in both cases. This enabled the teams to better 
understand the weaknesses and strengths of their individual projects and also to better 
understand their approach to innovation and their ability to foster disruption.   
Inappropriate Funding Routines: A better understanding 
       During the groundwork data collection activities and the DPM interventions, the 
practitioners in both cases A and B shared significant insights into their management 
actions, underlying management cognition and the resultant innovation activity.  The 
management teams reported numerous examples of times when they had been faced 
with the choice of selecting between projects of a sustaining or potentially disruptive 
nature and had chosen to allocate resources to the former.  Analysis of the data 
revealed five key management trends.  Furthermore, five common ‘disruptive 
innovation rejection strategies’ were identified.   
Trend 1: Companies deliver a narrow selection of innovation projects based on a 
restricted view of innovation 
 
Figure 3. Case B’s restricted mental model of innovation  
 
       The portfolio maps were placed upon the walls of the workshop rooms and were 
used to stimulate a holistic understanding of how the teams, in both cases, were 
currently funding their innovation effort.  It was clear that the management teams had 
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a very narrow view of what innovation is.  These illustrations enabled the participants 
to understand and question, for the first time, how their mental models of innovation 
restricted their organisation to a path of incrementalism (e.g. see Figure 3, note how 
the projects are clustered in one small area).  The head of one innovation team in case 
B stated “I feel like we’ve seen the light; now we know its time to get disruptive”. 
Trend 2: Strategies for reducing perceptions of risk are not sought 
       The second theme was that potentially disruptive projects are seen as too risky 
because of the rejection strategies employed.  Strategies for reducing risk will not be 
sought (e.g. partnering) until the prevailing restrictive mental model(s) are 
acknowledged and understood.   
Trend 3: Commercial risk tends to be harder to handle than technical risk 
       Practitioners in both cases showed time and again that potentially disruptive 
initiatives are less likely to be funded if commercial risk is perceived to be high.  
Confident in their own experience with and reliance upon a group of technologies, the 
practitioners were more likely to favour projects with technical difficulties than those 
facing market uncertainties.  The introduction of notions such as empathic design 
helped to give both cases confidence in unfamiliar market niches. 
Trend 4: Project-by-project planning kills disruptive innovation 
       Product planning appeared to be “done blind”.  Evidence showed that without a 
holistic view of their innovation activity management in both cases were more 
reluctant to fund potentially disruptive projects.  A holistic view illustrated imbalanced 
and generated holistic decision making. 
Trend 5: The temptation of “big money” mass market strategies 
       Both companies put pressure on their innovators to automatically adopt mass 
market strategies.  Consequently, project managers assumed that potentially disruptive 
projects need massive investment and that they should be complicated and technically 
sophisticated.  Even when evidence is provided to show that potentially disruptive 
products should be initially targeted at low-end or emerging market niches, managers 
still want to target “big money”.  Knowledge transfer on disruptive innovation is 
needed if management teams are to change this trend and organisations need a change 
of mind-set, if they are to avoid the temptation of trying to force disruption directly 
upon mainstream customers. 
Summary of the Observed Disruptive Innovation Rejection Strategies 
Rejection Strategy 1: Rewarding incrementalism: 
       One strategy used by management to avoid funding potentially disruptive ideas 
was to focus on current organisational rewards. It was found in both cases that explicit 
rewards offered, for example promotions and financial incentives, had a negative effect 
upon practitioners’ decisions to pursue disruptive innovation.  The rewards reduced 
creativity and caused management to disregard evidence that suggested their 
organisation’s current technologies or business models may be put to better use in 
opportunities differing to current practice.  For example, in case B, job creation was 
one of the major measures that was rewarded, thus the initiation of new product 
development projects for small niche markets, as characterised by disruptive 
innovation, was not supported.  In case A, explicit rewards were focused upon current 
production line enhancements – once again steering management’s attention to 
incrementalism.  It was found in both cases that implicit rewards, for example a sense 
of belonging and respect from peers, also had a negative effect upon practitioners 
decisions to pursue disruptive innovation.  Both cases A and B appeared to display an 
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“Emergency Room” culture [22], especially case A, which is characterised by the 
existence of implicit rewards for the ability to conduct ‘rapid fire’ analyses of 
situations, where judgements need to be made quickly, along with prompt action.  
When implicit rewards exist for reacting quickly, making fast assumptions and 
insisting upon quick action, there is little support for suspending judgement, building 
empathy for new ideas and nurturing potentially disruptive concepts.  When such a 
culture dominates and is rewarded, creativity is reduced and new ideas are quickly 
killed.  There is evidence to suggest that the negative effects of rewards upon creativity 
and innovation are common for other organisations too [23] 
Rejection Strategy 2: Ignoring positive aspects of disruptive opportunities 
       Managers admitted (in retrospect and in trust) to occasions where they rejected 
disruptive opportunities, in favour of sustaining innovation, by removing the positive 
aspects of the rejected prospect and/or removing the negative aspects of the chosen 
initiative.  For example, in case A the management team had recently faced a decision 
between two dissonant projects.  Should they increase the allocation of resources to a 
project that was to deliver a new high-end product in their existing range or invest 
resources into a project with disruptive potential in a new and totally different 
emerging market?  The senior management were insistent that they could deliver new 
wealth generation by encouraging customers to move into the high-end of their market 
(where they forecasted higher revenues and higher margins).  In doing so they ignored 
the evidence which showed that most of their customer losses were to be found at the 
low-end of the market and that the high-end was small, shrinking and already 
saturated.  Much of the customer base, it would seem, were now happy to purchase 
cheaper, lower quality, substitute products from China.  Alternatively, evidence 
showed that the emerging market within the unfamiliar industry (although currently 
small with only potential for large growth) could provide case A with a new high 
margin revenue stream.  Competitive intensity within the market for the new concept 
was low and the current players were ignoring non-consumers and low-end customers 
who were in a situation of massive technology oversupply.  Furthermore, the current 
players did not have as advanced technology and facilities as case A to deliver the 
potentially disruptive proposition, which was based upon a cluster of simpler 
technologies.  Despite the evidence, the potentially disruptive opportunity was labelled 
by the senior management team as ‘too risky’ for two reasons: (1) they felt the 
emerging market was “not yet large enough” and (2) they were “too unfamiliar with 
the emerging industry”.  The positive aspects of the opportunity with disruptive 
potential were removed and the lack of promise in manufacturing high-end products 
was ignored – feelings of “uneasiness” surrounding disruption were alleviated with the 
decision taken in favour of incrementalism. 
Rejection Strategy 3: Focusing upon historical perceptions of success 
       “We’ve always been the world leaders in ‘product X’” said the director of R&D in 
case B, “we are the best in the world, no-one can make those like we do”.  Almost the 
whole management team in case B were comfortable with the idea that they could 
generate ‘disruptions’ in unfamiliar market places.  However, past success, with world 
beating technologies, made many of them believe that they would not be disrupted in 
their current mainstream markets, despite preliminary evidence of ‘technology over-
supply’ in several product categories.  Similar evidence existed in case A.  It would 
seem that the organisational memory for the factors that have been responsible for 
recent successes, become embedded in the cognitive processes of the organisation’s 
management practitioners.  Consequently, current perceptions of success prevent 
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practitioners from perceiving the potential for disruptive change in their primary 
technologies and customer offerings, thus ideas that go against the grain of history 
generate feelings of uneasiness and do not get funded. 
Rejection Strategy 4: Creating perception of success with high effort 
       Evidence in the data, linked to the amount of effort expended on current 
innovation initiatives, points to another cognitive strategy employed by practitioners to 
reduce the feeling of uneasiness surrounding disruptive innovation (thus legitimising 
allocation of resources to sustaining innovations).  Both cases sited examples of 
“prestige innovation projects” where huge amounts of effort were being invested.  The 
targets of the high-activity, prestige projects were nearly always the improvement of 
highly mature products and/or technologies for familiar markets.  The data analysis 
revealed a correlation between the amounts of reported effort, which management 
teams had invested into their prestige projects, and the perception of attractiveness of 
the outcome of this resource allocation.  In case A, for example, resources invested 
into prestige projects were targeted at improving core offerings, to retain market share 
and to remain competitive with insurgent Chinese rivals.  It was observed that the 
practitioners, in the face of growing year on year competition, commit more and more 
effort, yet achieve less and less benefit.  Despite the performance analysis results, 
which illustrate that such project teams had hit the point of diminishing returns, senior 
management appeared keen to exaggerate the benefits of their high effort projects, both 
in their own minds and to the rest of the business.  In both cases the more effort the 
management teams had invested into their prestige projects, the more they sought to 
exaggerate the attractiveness of the outcome of this resource allocation.  Perceived 
attractiveness was, therefore, linked to effort and appearance and not always measured 
benefits calculations.  The perception of exaggerated attractiveness provides insights 
into the cognition of practitioners faced with the choice of funding a project of a 
sustaining or potentially disruptive innovation.  The experience of uneasiness 
generated by the existence of a potentially disruptive innovation can be alleviated by 
deciding to fund the unjustly attractive, but perceptually desirable, high-effort 
incremental innovation and rejecting the potentially disruptive alternative. 
Rejection Strategy 5: Holding beliefs in the face of disconfirming information 
       Both cases A and B appeared to hold beliefs that were unchangeable in the 
presence of disconfirming information.  Case B, for example, had identified a 
potentially disruptive business opportunity in an unfamiliar market.  Senior 
management kindly agreed to share their idea with the authors, for the benefit of the 
current research and in return for a workshop that introduced a summary of best 
practice guidance and advice, from academic literature, on the implementation of 
disruptive strategies.  Concordantly, a one-day interactive workshop was designed and 
implemented with the project team and a cross functional support group from other 
areas of the business unit.  There were 32 participants in total who took part in the state 
of the art knowledge transfer activity.  At the end of the workshop 80% of the ‘junior’ 
members of the group reported that the workshop had contributed “high benefits” to 
their professional development and understanding of disruptive innovation (20% 
medium-to-high benefits).  All of these people reported that they believed the theories 
discussed would help the project succeed as did all of the senior members of the group 
who had not previously been involved in the project.  Conversely, 80% of the senior 
project members reported their disappointment with the notion that disruptive 
innovations should be initially launched with comparatively small projects for specific 
niche markets.  The distinct majority of the senior project team dismissed the 
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information and sought to persuade other participants within the workshop to do the 
same. They believed in the potential of their concept so much, that they wanted to 
launch a multi-million dollar, 5-10 year project that would compete directly with 
industry incumbents in their mainstream market.  Thus another strategy employed in 
both cases A and B was simply the dismissal and/or misinterpretation of information 
that was inconsistent with beliefs of the practitioners.  
MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS 
       The cases have provided an excellent insight into the ‘funding routines’ problem.  
The following management implications can be offered to companies seeking to tackle 
funding barriers to foster disruptive innovation: 
• Graphical ‘maps’ generated to illustrate a holistic view of the innovation activity can 
be employed to create an understanding that is otherwise very difficult to achieve.  
Holistic understanding has proven essential when justifying investments into 
disruptive innovation. 
• Management meetings to discuss innovation, become significantly more focused on 
the task in hand when graphical ‘maps’ are used to illustrate a holistic view of 
innovation activity.  “What we’ve delivered in this workshop in two days would 
have taken us at weeks without your help, and we still would be able to see what was 
really happening” said the director of case A. 
• Holistic graphical representations improve dialogue and communication.  This 
generates more directed, open discussion and prevents one person or one group from 
dominating the resource allocation process. 
• Holistic tools such as the DPM can, with positive effects, increase management’s 
self awareness of their mental models and their impact.  Interventions that assist 
management teams with the surfacing, testing and improving of their internal mental 
models of how the world works will generate business benefits. 
• It is essential to reduce the perception of risk surrounding potentially disruptive 
innovation in order to remove the ‘funding routines’ barrier.  Reducing perception of 
risk can be achieved through the combination of (1) knowledge on the theory of 
disruptive innovation; (2) recognition of prevailing mental models and an 
understanding of why potentially disruptive opportunities have been ‘killed’ in the 
past; (3) an holistic view of innovation activity, which can be used to legitimise 
‘ring-fencing’ resources for potentially disruptive initiatives. 
• Top management must deliver a strategic commitment to disruptive innovation and 
hold supporting mental models.  If such a commitment exists, a holistic view of the 
innovation activity can help organisations to align actions with strategic goals, thus 
facilitating the selection and initiation of potentially disruptive projects. 
• The understanding of disruptive innovation must be communicated across a wider 
audience than those responsible for resource allocation for it to be absorbed and 
adopted by organisations. 
CONCLUSIONS 
       It is believed that the Mode 2 approach adopted by the authors has proved vital in 
establishing the academic rigour of the investigation whilst also addressing a pertinent 
industrial problem in the context of practice.  The focus of this research has been on 
transferring knowledge iteratively between practice and theory and theory and practice.  
This has facilitated the development of new knowledge on the theory of disruptive 
innovation and how it can be fostered in practice by organisations. 
       The aim of the current research was to better understand the existence of the 
failure to fund potentially disruptive innovations.  At the onset of the investigation into 
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the issue of inappropriate resource allocation routines, the authors envisaged that they 
would focus on inappropriate financing mechanisms and return on investment and 
probability of success calculations.  Instead the authors stumbled into managerial 
psychology, which literally skews reality to support incrementalism.  Graphical 
portfolio management tools, integrated with theory from disruptive innovation, appear 
to help tackle the funding barrier.  The research has found that management 
practitioners with a holistic understanding of innovation activity can be facilitated to 
challenge (and maybe even change) dominant mental models that prevent potentially 
disruptive innovations from receiving essential financial and managerial support. 
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